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Abstract
The transposition of the 2002/14/EC Directive, establishing a general framework for information 
and consultation (I&C), has proven contentious in largely voluntarist systems of employment 
regulation. Receiving particular criticism is the employee ‘opt-in’ mechanism as a means to access 
I&C rights. For non-union employees in particular, the ability and potential to negotiate rights 
for I&C is widely seen to be problematic. This article uniquely examines the opt-in mechanism 
in the context of non-unionism, considering how non-union employers respond to non-union 
employees invoking their legislative rights to I&C. Drawing upon a case study conducted over 
four years in a large non-union multinational, the evidence shows how the opt-in and negotiation 
process function to the advantage of the employer rather than the intended regulatory impact to 
advance employee rights.
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Introduction
Upon its introduction the 2002/14/EC Directive,1 establishing a general framework for 
informing and consulting (I&C) employees, was perceived as potentially significant for 
the UK and Ireland given both countries’ absence of statutory consultation traditions 
(Keller, 2003). Yet when transposed in the predominately voluntarist employment rela-
tions systems of the UK and Ireland, the national regulations for I&C constituted a flex-
ible interpretation of the European-wide Directive (Hall, 2010; Koukiadaki, 2010). 
Employers need not act unless 10% of their employees ‘opt-in’ to statutory procedures 
leading to a process of negotiated I&C agreements. Only where the regulations’ proce-
dures are opted-in, but no agreement is reached after a specified period of negotiation, do 
statutory I&C provisions become enforceable and then only for workers in firms above 
a 50 employee threshold.
Commentary on the regulations in the UK and Ireland has pointed to the opt-in mech-
anism as diluting the impact of the European Directive (Ales, 2009; Ewing and Truter, 
2005). Previews of the opt-in mechanism in both countries proposed that outside of trade 
union strongholds, employees in non-union firms would be unaware of I&C rights and 
the regulations would be planted into unfertile soil. Even for non-union employees who 
were aware of the regulations, it was maintained that few would risk opting-in for fear of 
employer reprisal (Dundon et al., 2006). It was suggested that where employees opted-
in, they might face the hurdle of employer opposition and would have to fight to secure 
an I&C agreement: a sizeable task for non-union employees lacking access to independent 
representation (Koukiadaki, 2009; Wilkinson et al., 2007). The transposed regulations 
were therefore seen as a missed opportunity to align employee voice in both Ireland and 
the UK with continental European traditions, as well as close the ‘representation gap’ in 
the face of declining unionised voice (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Hall, 2006).
There is little knowledge of employee opt-ins under the regulations in the UK and 
Ireland, transposed in 2004 and 2006 respectively. As such, there are only a small num-
ber of cases registered at the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) in the UK and the 
Labour Court2 in Ireland and these are not strictly opt-in cases, but rather employee-ini-
tiated disputes regarding the operation of existing agreements. However evidence on 
non-unionised workers actively seeking to opt-in and negotiate their rights to I&C, and 
how non-union employers might respond to such initiatives, is notably lacking. There is 
a knowledge gap in terms of how central features of I&C regulations function in this 
context. This article therefore addresses the unanswered, yet pertinent, question, how do 
non-union employers respond to non-union employees invoking their legislative rights 
to I&C? In itself the pursuit of such a question poses the challenge of sourcing an iden-
tifiable population of non-union employee opt-ins and negotiations. The methodology 
relies upon the identification of, and access to, a case study of an employer response to a 
non-union employee opt-in under the regulations. The case study is specifically an opt-in 
under the Irish transposition of the Directive, the Employee (Provision of Information 
and Consultation) Act 2006 (EPICA 2006). While a case specific to EPICA 2006 limits 
the transferability of findings to a consideration of the UK Information and Consultation 
of Employee Regulations 2004 (ICER 2004), there are fundamental similarities in 
design. Both provide for the employee-led opt-in and both require voluntary negotiations 
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with the fall-back position of the ‘Standard Rules’. Both, as noted, are also situated in a 
predominately voluntarist employment relations context. The workplace processes of a 
non-union opt-in, even under the specifics of EPICA 2006, should therefore hold interest 
to scholarship concerned with similar trajectories under ICER 2004. At a wider level the 
study is also relevant to a consideration of how the I&C Directive has been transposed in 
different European contexts and because it offers contemporary insights into how non-
union employees collectively attempt to use the law to advance their interests. It is there-
fore of interest to a general readership in evaluating whether the law acts as an effective 
substitute for enforcing worker rights in the absence of trade unionism.
The structure of this article is as follows: in the next section the article reviews the 
I&C employee opt-in mechanism, with emphasis on how employers might respond 
where it is pursued in a non-union context. A description of the research approach and the 
suitability of the case study to address the research question follows in the third section. 
The article presents the findings in the fourth section. The final section offers a discus-
sion of the findings, pointing to how the opt-in mechanism functioned to the advantage 
of the employer rather than the intended regulatory impact to enable employee rights.
Literature review
The I&C Directive, when first introduced, was regarded as entailing substantial implica-
tions for the predominately voluntarist economies of the UK and Ireland (Sisson, 2002). 
Although provided for in the context of collective redundancies and transfers of under-
takings, general rights to I&C had not been regulated by law in either country. ICER 
2004 in the UK and EPICA 2006 in Ireland established, in firms with at least 50 employ-
ees, a statutory framework providing employee access to I&C rights.3 The regulations 
are broadly similar in providing routes to establishing I&C agreements (see Table 1). 
First, 10% of employees can ask for negotiations to introduce I&C arrangements, the 
‘opt-in’ mechanism (ICER 2004, Regulation 7; EPICA 2006, Section 7). Second, 
employers can start negotiations at their own initiative (ICER 2004, Regulation 14; 
EPICA 2006, Section 7). Third, where an employer fails to respond to a valid request for 
negotiations to introduce I&C arrangements or where negotiations fail to result in an 
agreement within six months of an initial request (with no agreement to extend negotia-
tions), the default Standard Rules apply. This provides for an elected representative I&C 
forum prescribing the remit over which I&C is conducted (ICER 2004, Regulations 
18–20; EPICA 2006, Section 10).4
Both regulations provide for Pre-Existing Agreements (PEAs), enabling I&C arrange-
ments to be formed voluntarily outside the statutory framework (ICER 2004, Regulations 
8 and 9; EPICA 2006, Section 9). Some variation exists across jurisdictions in this regard. 
In the UK, no ‘cut-off point’ exists for employers to conclude PEAs, whereas in Ireland, 
PEAs had to be concluded no later than March 2008 on a phased basis contingent on firm 
size. In the UK, if a valid request is made by fewer than 40% of employees where a PEA 
exists, the employer may hold a ballot to ascertain employee endorsement of the request 
(ICER, Regulation 8). In Ireland, an employee request is null and void if a legitimate 
PEA is in place prior to the specified time lines (EPICA, Section 9). In both jurisdictions, 
the regulations do not proscribe an employer from introducing I&C arrangements 
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unilaterally without workforce agreement. However such arrangements cannot prevent 
10% of employees later opting to trigger negotiations for new I&C provisions.
Importantly, commentators propose that, in a context of non-unionism, the scope for 
employer unilateralism in relation to the regulations is high (Gollan, 2006). Empirical 
research illustrates that while in some cases there is a catalyst for employers to introduce 
(or revise existing) I&C arrangements, the legal framework is largely peripheral in prac-
tice (Hall et al., 2013). Employers are typically the dominant player and the managerial 
agenda determines the nature of I&C arrangements. In particular, Hall et al. (2013) found 
that employers tend to determine whether I&C is, in practice, active consultation or 
largely limited to downward communication.
Given the dominant role employers play in shaping a firm’s I&C arrangements gener-
ally, the requirement for employees to opt-in is a recurrent criticism of the Directive’s 
transposition in the UK and Ireland (Dundon et al., 2006; Ewing and Truter, 2005; Hall, 
2005). It is proposed that as far as undertakings with no union presence, the 10% thresh-
old of workforce support to opt-in is a difficult standard to meet in practice (Hall, 2005). 
The minimum number of signatures is 15, so in undertakings with fewer than 150 
employees, the threshold exceeds 10%. Hall and Terry (2004) and Ewing and Truter 
(2005) consider the likelihood and extent of employees opting-in to I&C arrangements 
limited due to low awareness or inadequate understanding of rights, especially in smaller 
undertakings and those with no tradition of representation. Some scholars speculate that 
it might prove difficult to find employees prepared, or able, to take the lead in mobilising 
I&C requests, particularly in the face of employer hostility (Dundon et al., 2006). A lack 
of interest in I&C on the part of employees is also seen as a possibility, undermining 
attempts to opt-in (Hall, 2005). In the absence of independent support, mistakes in opt-in 
requests are probable due to a lack of employee understanding around threshold levels or 
other flaws in the application (Ewing and Truter, 2005: 630). A regulatory technicality 
may also undermine employees’ ability to secure gains via the opt-in clause as where 
errors occur, around failure to meet threshold levels for example, future applications to 
trigger the regulations are ruled out for two (Ireland) or three years (UK) (ICER 2004, 
Regulation 12; EPICA 2006, Section 7).
That errors might afflict attempts to utilise the regulations has been substantiated from 
cases registered at the CAC and Irish Labour Court, where several mistakes have been 
made by applicants (cf. in the UK, Archibald/Gardner Denver, IC/23/2009; Rodriguez/
Ocado Limited, IC/24/2009; Selormey/Electronic Data Systems Ltd, IC/21/2008; UK 
Pye/Partnerships in Care Limited, IC/11/2007; and in Ireland, Lionbridge Technologies/A 
Worker, ICC/13/3). In cases which appear to be led by non-union workers, the ‘success’ 
rate is quite low: the claim is found by the CAC to be without merit (Demming/Coin 
Street Community Builders, IC/41/2012; Wincanton Container Logistics, IC/39/2011) or 
not relevant for a hearing under the regulations (Archibald/Gardner Denver Limited, 
IC/23/2009). In contrast, there is no evidence on cases where non-union employees suc-
cessfully opt-in to invoke their legislative rights to I&C arrangements or on how employ-
ers respond to such occurrences. Yet this aside, assuaging the deficit is the existing 
literature on non-union employment relations. This offers insights into plausible trajec-
tories in employer responses to non-union workers’ efforts at initiating new structures for 
voice. As such, three strands can be identified.
Cullinane et al. 7
The first proposes that in the absence of independent resources, non-union employees 
find it difficult to influence organisational voice. As a result, they are vulnerable to what 
might be termed the ‘manipulative unilateralism’ of employers. Support for this position 
can be variously found in the literature examining non-unionised workers’ attempts to 
organise into unions (Bacon, 1999; Gall, 2004), participate in German works councils 
(Royle, 1999) and non-union employee representation (Gollan, 2007). Workers attempt-
ing to insert a measure of bilateralism into the non-union firm’s voice arrangements can 
fall victim to intimidation and suppression where employer hostility is present. While the 
regulations in both jurisdictions provide protection against victimisation for representa-
tives (EICR 2004, Part VIII; EPICA 2006, Section 13), EPICA 2006 is silent on protec-
tion for the employees who seek to trigger negotiations, whereas, in contrast, these 
employees are protected under ICER 2004, Regulation 32(5). Requests for I&C might 
also be simply ‘bought off’ by improved terms and conditions (Roy, 1980). Aside from 
efforts to trigger I&C arrangements, the negotiation itself might be problematic as 
employers manipulate process and outcomes to preserve their prerogatives. The tactic of 
‘bargaining [workers] to death’ (Roy, 1980: 414) in the form of ‘bad faith’ negotiation 
may be pursued, obstructing the signing of an agreement. Non-union employees may 
encounter ‘employer stonewalling’, where employers claim ostensibly legitimate obsta-
cles by challenging the validity of the employee opt-in, or, for example, calling for bal-
lots (Gall, 2004). Butler (2005) has maintained that in negotiating I&C arrangements, 
non-union employees may not be experienced enough to engage in the relevant issues. 
This is particularly likely where employees are confronted with a coterie of human 
resource specialists. Notably the regulations in both jurisdictions are silent on financial 
resources or specific rights to training for those engaged in negotiations. Nor do the regu-
lations allow for external expert assistance when the original I&C arrangements are 
negotiated. Thus negotiated arrangements that are employer-driven or purely symbolic 
are likely (Gilman and Marginson, 2002).
A second strand within the literature on non-union voice suggests a trajectory of what 
might be termed ‘calculative bilateralism’ in relations between employer and employee. 
Non-union employees may find their request for I&C arrangements pragmatically, if 
reluctantly, conceded should the employer be concerned with staving off further unrest 
from the employee body or seek compliance with the regulatory requirements. Kaufman 
and Taras (2010) and Gollan (2010) identify such a possibility. This argument suggests 
that when employees seek the introduction of voice structures, they have expectations 
that they will be consulted and have influence. This expectation creates a form of lever-
age for non-union workers, since if the company reneges then morale may plummet and 
the risk of unionisation rises. The employer has to consider that to obstruct a request for 
voice carries a cost of jeopardising employee cooperation. To foster cooperation, the 
employer must ensure that employees see some ‘wins’ on their side. If not, the employer 
risks a widening ‘expectations–achievement gap’ creating employee frustration, erosion 
of trust and even bigger ‘losses’ for the employer in the future (Taras and Copping, 
1998). In the context of I&C regulations, an employer may wish to enter into negotia-
tions with employees who have opted-in thus minimising the risk of third-party interven-
tion in the firm’s employment relations. Or the employer may reluctantly enter 
negotiations with the goal of ‘damage limitation’, cooperating with the request for 
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negotiations so as to avoid the imposition of the default Standard Rules from a failure to 
negotiate.
While non-union employees can secure the introduction of I&C arrangements on the 
back of compromises associated with calculative exchanges, a third strand of literature 
points to where the employer is disposed to an I&C request. This might be where an 
employer seeks, what could be termed, sophisticated bilateralism in their relations with 
employees. That is, non-union employees seeking to opt-in will find a hospitable envi-
ronment where their employer is disposed to being an ‘active consulter’ (Hall et al., 
2013) and is willing to use the opportunity to proactively create arrangements that enable 
employee involvement. Employers will actively collaborate with an employee request 
to negotiate an I&C agreement as such arrangements align with a managerial desire 
to improve organisational performance by fostering greater commitment and unity of 
interest. In a study of I&C arrangements, Koukiadaki (2010) found such potential where 
both parties engaged meaningfully to integrate employee interests in decision-making. 
While one might expect employers of this type to pre-empt the necessity for such voice 
mechanisms, thereby negating the necessity of an opt-in request in the first instance, it 
may occur where employees request a shift from direct involvement schemes to more 
representative voice arrangements, as the regulations in both jurisdictions allow.
In aggregate, the literature on non-union voice is suggestive of variability in the tra-
jectories that might characterise an employer response to an opt-in and negotiation 
attempt under the I&C regulations. The three trajectories noted above are purely ideal: 
overlap is likely in practice. While the trajectories identify some ways in which the regu-
lations might influence workplace-level attempts to negotiate I&C agreements, they 
must be regarded, in the absence of evidence, as speculative and uncertain. For instance, 
it could be supposed that the regulations have little substantive influence apart from 
prompting the parties towards negotiations in light of a valid opt-in. In this context, 
employers may feel confident that the scope for voluntary agreements offers opportuni-
ties to act unilaterally. On the other hand, the employer may be fully aware of bargaining 
under the shadow of the law, be conscious of possible sanctions that might occur where 
voluntary arrangements fail and thus be encouraged towards bilateral solutions. In light 
of this uncertainty, the research seeks to determine, how do employers respond to non-
union employees invoking their rights to I&C?
Research method
Seeking to empirically study an opt-in is challenging as an identifiable population is not 
strictly available. While the aforementioned CAC and Irish Labour Court databases pro-
vide a list of disputes in each jurisdiction, these are not necessarily instances of non-
union opt-ins and negotiations. In the UK, of the 16 undertakings where I&C disputes are 
recorded, 10 are either union-organised or occurred in the context of already unionised 
firms. The remaining six are uncertain regarding union status, but might reasonably be 
assumed to be non-union as they were led by named individuals (rather than union rep-
resentatives) and the reports give no account of union involvement. Yet five of these 
cases were considered invalid applications by the CAC and one was a dispute over the 
functioning of a valid PEA. In Ireland, of the six undertakings where I&C disputes were 
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registered at the Labour Court, two were union-organised, one was a non-union dispute 
over the functioning of a PEA and three, which appear to be non-union, were considered 
invalid applications and dismissed by the Court.
In the difficulty of accessing a sample of a valid opt-in, the strategy was to rely on a 
convenience sample, identifying a known instance of non-union employees making a 
valid request and seeking to negotiate I&C arrangements in a non-union firm (the details 
of how the case was identified are below). While there are limitations to relying on a 
single case, the intention was to provide an illustrative example of an understudied 
dynamic; albeit mindful of case-specific variance potentially affecting observed pro-
cesses and outcomes. The case study, as noted above, is an opt-in under the Irish trans-
position of the Directive, EPICA 2006.
The case
The case is based in a non-union firm, anonymised as CompanyA, a US-owned manu-
facturer. A profitable company, operating in an oligopolistic market, it has over 70 sites 
across five continents, employing 25,000 people. The company has three sites in Ireland 
employing over 4000. The focus of the study is its largest plant facility employing close 
to 3000, which is also CompanyA’s largest manufacturing site in its global plant network. 
It has a large, well-resourced personnel department, which has received awards from 
professional accreditors for its people-management practices. The work at the facility is 
mainly assembly line work.
CompanyA was first identified in 2008 through a larger research project concerned 
with potential responses to the I&C Directive. Access was not forthcoming from the 
employer however. Several months later, in the summer of 2009, the same organisation 
was reported in a media source as subject to an opt-in request. Follow-up contact was 
made with both the employer and the employee activists, of which there was a loose 
coalition of 14 at the campaign’s peak, involved in requesting I&C negotiations. The 
employer proved unwilling to participate. However the employees in question provided 
access to documents pertaining to the case and participated in meetings with the 
researchers.
Information sources: Documentary analysis
The documentary sources include: internal emails from the activists, employer emails to 
the employee body, intranet employer postings on the matter of I&C to the employee 
body, employer–activist written exchanges, minutes from employer–activist meetings 
and third-party communication with both employer and activists from state agencies. In 
total, 50 pieces of documentation of this sort were available. An exemplar of documenta-
tion is provided in Figure 1.
In using documentation to build a case study, Scott’s (1990: 6) criteria of authenticity, 
credibility and representativeness are used. These criteria are important given that the activ-
ists were the exclusive gatekeepers to the documents. In supporting authenticity, the 
researchers wers given access to original documents, enabling confirmation of the document 
source, e.g. employer documents with company watermark and third-party communications 
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Figure 1. Exhibit 1: Document example: Employer correspondence with third-party body.
with signed and dated official stamps. Access to employer correspondence with the wider 
employee body, the employee activists and state dispute resolution bodies did provide, in the 
absence of direct employer access, some ‘employer voice’ on the case and supported a more 
balanced depiction of different viewpoints. We were able to sufficiently construct the 
employer arguments put forward at various points over the course of the opt-in dynamic 
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(Exhibit 1 in Figure 1 is an example of employer documentation arguing the company’s 
position at one point in the case). While documents written by the employer and activists 
cannot be regarded as free from distortion, they can provide credible insights into the opt-in 
process. Collated, the available documents offer a representative and accurate picture of the 
opt-in process at CompanyA. While pertinent documents could have been withheld by the 
activists to portray their campaign favourably, no obvious gaps emerged in the analysis sug-
gesting this to be so.
The analysis of documents followed a pattern of qualitative content analysis (Altheide, 
1996). Documents were organised into an identifiable time sequence, using specified 
dates provided in letters, emails and meetings. Predefined thematic codes, derived from 
expectations around the prescribed legislative process, guided the analysis of this time-
line. The predefined codes stemmed from what were expected to be important features 
of an opt-in request. These were (1) the organisation of the opt-in request, (2) the nature 
of the employer response to the opt-in request, (3) the nature of the negotiations that 
ensued, (4) the intervention (if any) of third-party supports and (5) identifiable outcomes 
of the process. This analysis followed Altheide’s (1996: 16) recommendation to have 
initial categories guide the examination, while being mindful that others could emerge in 
the analysis phase. The thematic predefined codes provided useful foci for interrogating 
the documentation and are largely retained below alongside case-specific themes that 
emerged from the analysis. Thematic analysis of documents was undertaken by three 
members of the research team to mitigate inaccuracies in interpretation of material.
Information sources: Interviews
Between 2009 and 2012, over 20 hours of unstructured meetings with the activists were 
conducted, as well as additional follow-up exchanges through telephone and email. 
There was a loose coalition of 14 activists at the campaign’s peak, and varying numbers 
of the 14 participated at various ad-hoc meetings, in telephone calls and in emails with 
the researchers. The activists were exclusively male, early to mid-twenties, with between 
three and five years’ work experience in the company. All were shift-work assembly line 
operatives. None had experience of union membership. Most of the contact was activist 
initiated and meetings were therefore often unplanned, spontaneous and unstructured. 
These meetings focused on how the campaign to opt-in and negotiate I&C arrangements 
was developing from an employee perspective. These were carried out by one researcher. 
Recognising the partiality of such information has meant that in the absence of employer 
participation, and to minimise biases that might arise from relying on activists’ primary 
accounts, only evidence that can be cross-checked against the documentation is utilised 
to strengthen reliability of the findings.
Findings
The findings from the case are presented below. To aid comprehension of what is a com-
plex case, the thematic predefined codes alongside case specific themes that emerged 
from the analysis are used to frame the findings. To assist the reader, a graphic summary 
of the case timeline is offered in Figure 2.
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Background to opt-in request
The origin of the opt-in request at CompanyA stemmed from the activities of a small 
number of assembly workers on the shop-floor in 2009. Originally one member of this 
group (referred to as Employee A) became aware of EPICA 2006 through part-time 
study in a local university. In early 2009, this individual informed close work colleagues 
about the regulations, the possibilities for opting-in and relevant procedures. A loose 
group of 14 employees became a coalition of activists seeking an opt-in request, although 
three to four activists appear to have been most prominent. Perhaps contrary to the spirit 
of EPICA 2006,5 this group’s interest in the legislation was articulated as a desire to ‘get 
back’ at the company, whose management style they regarded as authoritarian and puni-
tive. There is some evidence to support this: for instance, employees being placed in 
repetitive work stations against their will, despite requesting lighter work due to repeti-
tive strain injuries. One such case was taken against the company and won in a civil 
court. There were also complaints about bad posture in work chairs that caused back 
injury; again a successful civil action was taken by a former employee. Activists com-
plained about regularly turning up for their shift to discover parts were not ready, leaving 
them without work to do; supervisors then insisted they go home early and take such 
time out of holiday entitlements. Consequently, the prospect of coercing management, 
through the law, to do something it would not otherwise do, appealed to the activists. 
Notably activists indicated in interviews an unwillingness to engage union advice or 
involvement, partly due to a belief that their employer would never negotiate with a 
union and partly because, in the words of one activist, ‘we wanted to do our own thing, 
rather than make it a union thing’.
Organising of opt-in request
In the initial phase of activist coalescence, some logistical problems prevailed as activists 
worked in different departments and shifts. Conscious to avoid managerial attention, 
intra-group communication was confined to outside of work meetings and email 
exchange with discussions held over the process for triggering negotiations, particularly 
how the 10% threshold might be secured. Despite taking precautions to remain unno-
ticed, the group proved unable to avoid supervisor attention. Within workgroups, rumours 
arose that the activists were involved in ‘union organising’ and it appears some co-workers 
reported this to supervisors, although activists professed ignorance when informally 
questioned. By the summer of 2009, the activists prepared to collect employee signatures 
in support of the opt-in. They concluded that 133 employee signatures were required – to 
be secured during shift-changeovers in cloak rooms, rather than approaching employees 
on the shop-floor. In cloak rooms employees were asked to sign, with their name and 
employee number, a petition supporting the creation of an ‘Information and Consultation 
Forum’. This activity was reported to have proceeded smoothly and within minutes.
The collection of signatures was forwarded to the Labour Court rather than directly to 
the employer. Within two weeks, the Court responded to the corresponding author for the 
group. The Court acknowledged receipt of the request, advised it had contacted the 
employer and was awaiting a response. In turn the Court notified CompanyA stating that 
14 Economic and Industrial Democracy 
it had received a request under EPICA 2006, Section 7 and requested confirmation that 
the threshold had been met. Further, the Court requested it:
… would also be obliged if you could indicate if the Company intends to enter into negotiations 
with employees or their representatives to establish information and consultation arrangements 
in accordance with the Act. (Labour Court correspondence to CompanyA, June 2009)
Employer response to opt-in request
In response, the employer noted that ‘we were somewhat surprised to receive your let-
ter’, claiming that CompanyA had a ‘joint information and consultative forum’ in place 
‘predating the legislation’, in the form of an ‘Information Forum’ (CompanyA corre-
spondence to Labour Court, July 2009). The company claimed the Forum had been set 
up in 2005 and ‘constituted in line with the legislation’. The employer advanced that ‘any 
perceived grievances relating to I&C have not been raised by employees directly with 
management’ or through the Forum. The company also advanced that it employed 2941 
employees, and that ‘the number of 133 employees associated with this request does not 
constitute 10% or more of employees in the undertaking’; this misunderstood the 10% 
threshold was subject to a maximum of 100 employees, which, as the Court responded, 
had been attained (Labour Court correspondence to CompanyA, July 2009).
Employer promotion of ‘Information Forum’
In July, the activists claimed that a previously unheard of Information Forum appeared 
on the company intranet. The Forum appeared replete with a constitution and was 
claimed, in accompanying documentation, to be in place since 2006 (not 2005 as claimed 
in company correspondence to the Labour Court). Later company documentation from 
2010 claimed the Forum was set up in 2004 (Senior Operations Director correspondence 
to Employee B, November 2010), while a revised version of the constitution appeared on 
the intranet in September 2009 removing the date the body was founded (Company 
memo 2009a). Notably documentary evidence, printouts from the company intranet, 
suggest that the Forum’s constitution went through three different versions in July 2009, 
as the remit, scope and function of the body were re-phrased. The Forum, in first appear-
ing on the intranet, was presented as a body ‘to facilitate two way communication’ 
(Company memo 2009a). A week later this was revised to ‘facilitate communication of 
information and consultation’ (Company memo 2009b). The types of issues it was 
empowered to address changed in this time, as did the prescribed methods of I&C. Yet it 
was not signed by employee representatives nor indicated how it was approved by 
employees. Furthermore, the Human Resource Director circulated an email seeking new 
members, across departments, to sit on the forum ‘due to employees leaving CompanyA’ 
(Company memo 2009c). Subsequently, five individuals, none of whom were the activ-
ists, were managerially appointed to the Forum, meeting in September 2009 to discuss 
its workings. The activists claim these appointees were white-collar, clerical staff and not 
assembly workers. Documents of minutes support this view, indicating the five appoin-
tees were ‘business analysts’ or shop-floor supervisors.
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Activists challenge PEA status
In the interim, the activists were provided with CompanyA’s response by the Labour 
Court. They in turn responded to the Court, challenging the validity of the Forum as a 
PEA, maintaining it did not exist until after the opt-in request had been submitted nor 
was it agreed by employees. In August 2009, the Court corresponded with the employer 
seeking evidence that the Information Forum constituted an agreed PEA, proposing that 
it ‘might be helpful if we could have a copy of the agreement, which could confirm that 
[it] complies with Section 9(2) of the Act’.6 The Court further noted that:
You will appreciate that the Court does not purport to have any statutory right to seek this 
information and we are asking that you might provide it for the purpose of assisting the 
employees concerned in deciding whether or not they wish to pursue the matter further. (Labour 
Court correspondence to CompanyA, August 2009)
Responding to the Court, CompanyA stated it had ‘taken this opportunity to re- 
communicate’ with the workforce on the Forum and was reviewing its activities. The 
employer added that the Forum had existed since January 2005 (CompanyA correspondence 
to Labour Court, August 2009). In response, the Court informed the employer that it had still 
not ‘provided any information concerning the circumstances in which, what you regard as a 
pre-existing consultation agreement came into being’ (Labour Court correspondence to 
CompanyA, September 2009). In the Court’s opinion, the company had not submitted proof 
to the Court that it had a valid PEA. However the Court observed that,
…[the] Court’s role in the establishment of a negotiating forum is limited … The Court has 
carried out its function under Section 7 of the Act and accordingly, it has no further role in this 
matter at this time. (Labour Court correspondence to CompanyA, September 2009)
There was no response from CompanyA. Corresponding to the activists, the Court 
declared:
In effect, the Court’s role … is limited … the Court’s function is merely to notify the Employer 
of the request and it is then a matter for the Employer to commence negotiations with a view to 
establishing a forum. If the Employer fails to do so, the general scheme of the Act seems to be 
that the Standard Rules set out at Schedule 1 of the Act apply. (Labour Court correspondence to 
activists, September 2009)
Consequently the activists, in a September email to the Human Resource Director, signed 
off by Employee A as the primary correspondent, declared their interest in negotiating 
I&C to management.
Activists request negotiations
By the middle of October, the activists claimed no response had been received from the 
employer. Believing the three month timeline to be expired, the activists again corre-
sponded with the Court. They claimed the option of a negotiated agreement was closed 
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off because the timeframe for commencing negotiations had expired under EPICA 2006: 
neither a valid PEA could be demonstrated to exist, nor had the parties introduced a 
negotiated agreement or indeed entered into negotiations. Consequently, the activists 
maintained the adoption of the Standard Rules was required. In response, the Court, 
observing its functions under the legislation, stated that ‘it is necessary that internal dis-
putes resolution procedures be first utilised’ (Labour Court correspondence to activists, 
October 2009).7
In November, Employee A was contacted by the Human Resource Director who indi-
cated a willingness to discuss the opt-in request. Employee A, as the activists’ representa-
tive, was invited to write and submit their concerns about company I&C practices. The 
process was channelled through the employer’s individual grievance procedures. The 
activists’ submission (written by Employee A and agreed by the group) disputed the exist-
ence of a valid PEA. Meetings between Employee A, Employee B and the Human Resource 
Director occurred in December, but no consensus was reached over the disputed PEA. The 
employer maintained a PEA was in place and negotiations to create a new one were not 
necessary. Another request by the employer to resolve the matters in dispute was directed 
to four activists in the group (Employees A, B, C and D), who were then asked to partici-
pate in further discussions in January 2010. At this meeting, Employee A and Employee B 
were invited to sit on the Forum which had met once since its rejuvenation in July (and 
would meet on two further occasions in 2010). Both agreed to sit on the Forum on the 
understanding it would provide the opportunity to consider whether the body was in line 
with legislative requirements, and, if not, to assist in formalising arrangements in accord-
ance with the Standard Rules. However, the employer, in later communications to Employee 
A and B, claimed that their participation on the Forum was to assist in ‘the improvement of 
the existing body rather than create a new one’ (Regional Human Resource Manager cor-
respondence to Employee A, January 2010). This claim was disputed by the activists. The 
exchanges between the activists and the employer continued throughout 2010, whereby the 
former contended no valid PEA existed and the implementation of the Standard Rules was 
required. CompanyA sought to maintain the existing Information Forum, arguing that 
‘because we believe we have a valid pre-existing agreement that has not been proven oth-
erwise, the question of negotiating with employees does not arise’ (Senior Operations 
Director correspondence to Employee B, November 2010). At a meeting of the Forum in 
March 2010 the employer confirmed it ‘could not find’ a signed, dated copy of a PEA. 
However the Regional Human Resource Manager attending the meeting ‘gave several 
examples of how she felt there was a pre-existing agreement in place’ (Senior Operations 
Director correspondence to Employee B, July 2010; emphasis added).
Company referendum on I&C arrangements
Employee A and B’s involvement on the Forum, which met twice in 2010, and their con-
tinued challenging of its legitimacy prompted the employer to seek a settlement of the 
dispute in late 2010. On the grounds that ‘it was not appropriate for any small group of 
individuals or indeed for the Company to decide what information and consultation 
arrangements should apply for the future’ (Company documentation correspondence to 
Rights Commissioner, February 2011), the employer declared a plant-wide referendum 
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for December 2010 (to be overseen by an auditor, a consultant hired by the firm). The 
referendum was to allow employees either to continue with the existing Forum (whose 
constitution the employer had now drafted) or introduce the Standard Rules. Elections for 
representatives would occur concurrently with the referendum. The activists were opposed 
to the referendum, maintaining it sought to legitimise an invalid Forum, yet nonetheless 
proceeded to participate and contest. In the run up to the referendum, CompanyA drafted 
a circular to employees, entitled Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), outlining a series of 
questions and answers on the purpose of the referendum, the election and the proposed 
differences between the Information Forum and the Standard Rules. As shown in Table 2, 
this suggests minor differences, although the definition of consultation is stronger in the 
Standard Rules in emphasising ‘with a view to reaching agreement’. This is absent from 
the Information Forum.
The activists would claim in correspondence to the referendum auditor, the Labour 
Court, the Labour Relations Commission (LRC)8 and the Rights Commissioner9 that 
CompanyA imposed electioneering rules, allowing only employees who sat on the 
Information Forum to canvass on behalf of either agreement. The activists claimed that 
this undermined canvassing for the Standard Rules as aside from Employee A and B, the 
remaining Forum participants were managerial appointees from September 2009. 
Furthermore, it was claimed employees could not canvass outside their own work sta-
tion, limiting Employee A and B’s contact with other co-employees. Nor could employ-
ees canvass in the canteen or provide independent written documentation (aside from the 
Company’s FAQ). More contentiously, the activists claimed in correspondence to the 
Rights Commissioner that supervisors held meetings with small groups of employees on 
the morning of the referendum outlining why they should vote for the Information 
Forum: a vote for the Standard Rules would be viewed by headquarters as disloyal and 
affect future plant investment. While it is difficult to verify these claims, the consistency 
of such grievances being articulated to four different agencies suggests some plausibility. 
Furthermore the activists had no documentation of their own to provide in campaigning 
for the Standard Rules on the grounds that they were not allowed to disseminate material. 
The company’s FAQ is generally neutral in its presentation of the dispute, although mis-
representation is present. For example, the company claimed in Question 48:
I heard that there was a case in the Labour Court about the Information Forum. What was this 
about?
The company informed the Labour Court that it has long standing arrangements in place … 
since 2004. The Labour Court responded to the Company by confirming that the Labour Court 
accordingly had no further role in that request from the minority group of employees. 
(Frequently Asked Questions Internal Circular)
This distorts the Court’s decision to withdraw from the case as based on an invalid opt-in 
request, when it indicated it had no further role due to limited powers. The activists com-
plained to the auditor about procedural imbalances in presenting their case for the Standard 
Rules: the auditor’s response was that the matter was not in its remit as its role was to 
oversee the ballot and count results (Auditor correspondence to activists, December 2010).
While Employee A and B were elected to act as representatives, some uncertainty 
appears to have existed regarding the final referendum results. The activists claimed that 
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the reported result, presented on digital notice boards in the company, stated simply that 
the majority of those who voted, voted for the Information Forum. An attempt by the 
activists to secure figures on voting distributions from the employer was unsuccessful, as 
was a request to the auditor, who responded that their involvement in the case had ended 
and further issues should be addressed to the company (Auditor correspondence to activ-
ists, January 2011). The only documentary evidence on voting distribution available is a 
report by the company in later correspondence with the Rights Commissioner, which 
detailed the following pattern of votes in favour of the Information Forum:
Table 2. The Information Forum and Standard Rules format as presented in ‘What is the 
difference between our current agreement and a Standard Rules?’ Company referendum 
documentation entitled ‘Frequently Asked Questions’.
Information Forum Standard Rules
Meetings 2 times a year 2 times a year
Members Max. 30 Max. 30
Election of 
representatives
In practice employees should be 
nominated by 3 employees  
Election by secret ballot
Nominated by 2 employees  
Election by secret ballot
Definition of I&C The definitions provided for under 
Section 1 of the 2006 Act apply
Information means transmission 
by the Company to one or more 
employees or their representatives, 
or both, of data in order to enable 
them to acquaint themselves with the 
subject matter
Consultation means the exchange 
of views and establishment of 
dialogue between either one or more 
employees, employee representatives 
and the Company
The Standard Rules outline the following:
Information shall be given by the 
Company at the time, in the fashion and 
with the content appropriate to enable 
in particular the Forum to conduct an 
adequate study and where necessary 
prepare for consultation
Consultation shall take place (a) while 
ensuring the method, content and 
timeframe are appropriate
(b) at the relevant level of management 
and representation
(c) on the basis of information, supplied 
by the Company and of the opinion 
which the employee representatives are 
entitled to formulate
(d) in such a way as to enable the 
Forum to meet the company and obtain 
a response and the reasons for that 
response to any opinion they may form
(e) with a view to reaching agreement 
on decisions likely to lead to substantial 
changes in work organisation or in 
contractual relations, that are in the 
scope of the Company’s powers.
Topics Business strategy (company activities) Company activities (business strategy)
 Financial metrics (economic situation) Economic situation (financial situation)
 Investment plans (changes in work) Changes in work (investment plans)
 Organisational changes (changes in 
organisation)
Changes in organisation (organisational 
changes)
 Health and safety (employment 
situation)
Employment situation (health and safety)
 Legislation (contractual relations) Contractual relations (legislation)
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Activists seek third-party support
Weeks prior to the referendum, the activists lodged a complaint to the Rights 
Commissioner. This was referred under Section 15 of the regulations (cf. note 8), relating 
to dispute resolution. The activists claimed that they had exhausted the internal proce-
dures as advised by the Labour Court. Nonetheless this application was a mistake on the 
activists’ part as the Rights Commissioner’s role is confined to cases where representa-
tives are penalised for I&C activities. In their complaint, written on behalf of the group 
by Employee B, it was claimed the employer had refused to enter negotiations within 
three months of receiving the request as required and was committing an offence under 
Section 19 of the Act.10 CompanyA responded to the Rights Commissioner in December 
2010, claiming internal dispute mechanisms had not been exhausted by the individual 
who wrote the letter, but confirming that the company was willing to resolve the issue. A 
hearing was subsequently held in February 2011. At the hearing the employer argued the 
claim was invalid, citing time limits under Schedule 3 of the 2006 Act, wherein a Rights 
Commissioner should ‘not entertain a complaint … after the expiration of the period of 
6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates’ 
(Company documentation correspondence to Rights Commissioner, February 2011). In 
asserting this claim, CompanyA argued Employee B had claimed that the dispute was 
‘live since June 12th 2009’ and that this was 16 months prior to submission of the claim 
on 26 October. Further the Company argued:
[Employee B] has not utilised the internal dispute resolution process … The internal process 
referred to within his document was on behalf of [Employee A] and not [Employee B]. 
(Company documentation correspondence to Rights Commissioner, February 2011)
The Rights Commissioner responded that it ‘lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint’ 
(Rights Commissioner Decision, February 2011) on the grounds that the claim was 
brought under Section 15 and not Section 13 (the area of the legislation it is empowered 
to investigate). Now frustrated by the process, the activists, in a letter written by 
Employee C, contacted the Labour Court for assistance. Their letter was returned by the 
Court however as not specifying what section of the regulations Court assistance was 
sought. Composing a re-worked letter, the activists stated:
We wish the Court, therefore, to … seek to make available the said agreement for inspection. 
Thus by doing this we can clarify once and for all if that said agreement … is a valid pre-
existing agreement or is not. In making the request for the Court to act in this instance we do so 
as a sign of our frustration. Despite our best efforts in various negotiations and through a large 
exchange of correspondence with the HR Director, the company has not produced a copy of 
that agreement … (Activists’ correspondence to Labour Court, June 2011)
Total number of votes 1990 (78%)
Votes in favour of existing agreement 1233 (62%)
Votes in favour of Standard Rules 666 (34%)
Spoiled votes 91 (5%)
Company documentation correspondence to Rights Commissioner, February 2011.
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In response the Court stated that it was awaiting a response from the employer for clari-
fication on particular points. This the employer duly did, responding that the dispute had 
been resolved internally and an I&C Forum, supported by the majority of the workforce, 
as per the December 2010 ballot, was in place (Company correspondence to Labour 
Court, July 2011). In turn, the Court advised the activists to seek the assistance of the 
LRC should it wish to pursue matters further (Labour Court correspondence to activists, 
August 2011).
Campaign concludes
Significantly, the activists were weakened in 2011 as two leading members were dis-
missed from the company. Early that year, disciplinary procedures were initiated against 
Employee A for failing to submit a sick note after a work absence. He was subsequently 
dismissed. In response, Employee A lodged a claim for unfair dismissal and victimisa-
tion – on the grounds of participating in the opt-in campaign – at the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal.11 An out of tribunal financial settlement was later agreed with the 
company. Employee B was also dismissed in late 2011 for failing to provide documenta-
tion relating to a work absence. Similarly, Employee B brought a tribunal case for unfair 
dismissal and victimisation, again settled through an out of tribunal financial offer by the 
employer. The loss of two key activists seemed to hinder campaign momentum in 2012, 
although for a time remaining activists persisted, turning to the LRC for assistance. The 
LRC contacted the employer, indicating its willingness to resolve the dispute, but 
CompanyA declined, declaring that no dispute existed. The LRC subsequently notified 
the Labour Court that attempts to resolve the issues at local level had been exhausted. 
While this led to some further exchanges on the same issues in dispute, led by Employee 
D, CompanyA refused to entertain that a dispute existed. By the end of 2012, initiative 
among the activists had waned and, at time of writing, the campaign appeared to be fin-
ished. Remaining activists were discouraged by the dismissal of Employee A and B, 
concluding the costs of pursuing an application further outweighed the benefits. By the 
start of 2013, the campaign was inactive and was dropped.
Discussion
In assessing how employers respond to non-union employees invoking their rights to 
I&C, three strands of interpretation were inferred from the literature: manipulative uni-
lateralism, calculative bilateralism and sophisticated bilateralism. The findings exhibited 
the trajectory of manipulative unilateralism insofar as activist efforts to opt-in fell foul of 
employer avoidance, suppression and substitution. When presented with a valid opt-in, 
the employer counter-advanced an internal forum as a PEA, the status of which appeared, 
on the basis of available evidence, unconvincing. This claim was utilised by the employer 
to obstruct attempts to negotiate I&C arrangements. In a context where the PEA claim 
was contested, the employer sought to co-opt activists on their preferred voice forum. 
When this failed to dampen the preferences of activists for negotiations, the employer 
sought retrospectively to legitimise their preferred forum through a referendum, the prior 
canvassing of which appeared biased by employer behaviour. While the outcome sug-
gests the employer’s favoured arrangement might well have many similarities with the 
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activists’ sought-after statutory variant, what remains more significant is how the 
employer evaded the triggered pathway to pursue their own ambitions without reference 
to legislative prescription. Indeed the design of the EPICA 2006 did little to deter the 
employer from circumventing regulatory requirements. For example, the Labour Court 
observed that it lacked authority to verify the PEA and was reliant on the goodwill of the 
employer. In the absence of verification, the employer was free, post the valid opt-in, to 
promote a preferred body and ignore requirements for negotiation. The fulfilment of 
legislative prescription was delegated to non-unionised employees. Despite meeting the 
first hurdle of formally opting-in, employees continued to carry the responsibility of 
manoeuvring complex legislation in a context of an employer unreceptive to regulatory 
influence and bilateral engagement. State assistance was arm’s-length, requiring, with no 
prescribed timelines, internal dispute resolution exhaustion and LRC assistance before a 
case could be heard at the Court. A protracted process of this sort sorely disadvantages 
employees, leaving them exposed to employer manipulation.
The case demonstrates that even where the regulations are self-consciously deployed 
by employees, the legal procedures designed to assist the process are porous and subor-
dinated by employer preference. This outcome is possible for several contextual reasons. 
At source, EU-led regulations, like the Directive, have progressively been imbued with 
a degree of flexibility permitting member states greater latitude in transposition to fit 
national cultures (Gold, 2009). In Streeck’s (1995: 45–49) terms, what distinguishes con-
temporary EU social policy is its ‘low capacity to impose binding obligations on market 
participants, and the high degree to which it depends on various kinds of voluntarism … 
in the name of self-regulation’. The flexibility of the transposition process enabled Irish 
policymakers to design EPICA 2006 with a regulatory bias towards voluntary solutions 
at workplace level. Historically, the Irish system, like Britain, has relied upon volunta-
rism in regulating employment conditions: an arrangement traditionally favoured by 
organised labour given their antipathy to legal intervention and a preference for using 
labour market power to sanction wayward employers (Turner et al., 2013). Yet volunta-
rism imposes few regulatory constraints on employers and becomes a euphemism for 
employer dominance in conditions of union weakness and decline. Such voluntarism 
however has complemented a core plank of the Irish state’s trade policy pivoting around 
attracting foreign investment from multinationals, disproportionately from those of 
American origin (Lamare et al., 2013). Policymakers have thus opted to eschew labour 
market policies endangering the country’s attractiveness as an investment location for 
such firms: hence Ireland stands out uniquely in Europe in lacking statutory trade union 
recognition. US multinationals are well known for their antipathy to independent 
employee representation and their desire to exercise unfettered prerogatives at plant level 
(Edwards et al., 2005). While this preference is moderated where US subsidiaries locate 
in coordinated national and sectoral systems, liberal-market economies (LMEs), like 
Ireland, offer greater discretion to pursue preferred policies (Marginson et al., 2004). 
Consequently US multinationals have carved out a terrain of union-free plants in the 
Irish pharmaceuticals, electronics and software sectors: indeed their freedom to do so is 
presented as a unique selling point by Irish investment agencies abroad.
The state’s acquiescence to multinational preference is also evident in the access the 
latter have to high-level policy: Collings et al. (2008) note how the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Ireland and multinationals like Intel had extensive access to government 
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in the period prior to the transposition of the I&C Directive, ensuring that the rights of 
employees under the EPICA 2006 were heavily imbued with employer influence and 
permissive of company-level flexibility. Trade unions on the other hand were isolated 
from these discussions, although it has been maintained that they remained tepid to the 
Directive, suspicious it might compete with collective bargaining (Dobbins, 2010). 
Rather unions have devoted resources to campaigning for statutory recognition rights. 
This combined result of EU regulatory voluntarism, state–multinational collusion and 
unions’ isolation from the regulatory space culminated in the porous I&C regulations 
evident in our case; providing ample scope for employer avoidance, light-touch over-
sight and legislative complexity that obstructs employee access to voice rights. In this 
context it is interesting to note survey evidence that reports how the I&C Directive has 
positively impacted on the number and type of voice structures within MNCs in the UK 
and Ireland (Lavelle et al., 2010; Marginson et al., 2010). These survey-based studies 
have found that MNCs, in response to the introduction of the regulations in both coun-
tries, established non-union indirect consultation structures where they did not previ-
ously exist. The case in this article suggests that this evidence should be interpreted with 
caution: our case employer could certainly report I&C arrangements in response to the 
regulations, but in reality such initiatives hardly appear consistent with the ‘spirit’ or 
content of the legislation.
A final implication which the case raises is whether the law can secure non-union 
employee access to I&C and indeed be an effective substitute for declining union influ-
ence. Pollert (2007), among others, has argued how knowledge and resource constraints 
tend to impede non-union workers accessing legal rights, an argument amply demon-
strated in our case. Relatedly, Colling (2010: 328) has maintained that where the law 
imposes norms on employers inconsistent with their values, responses are likely to be 
characterised by, at best, ritualism (instrumental compliance to the letter of the law with-
out necessarily carrying out its spirit) and, at worst, retreat (avoiding the law actively or 
simply ignoring it). The potential of independent employee opt-ins under the shadow of 
the law is likely an anathema to many non-union employers, and thus opportunistic 
avoidance is likely.
Given the probability that I&C rights fail to encroach into non-union workplaces, 
social institutions bridging this gap and providing ‘positive mediation’ between the law 
and the workplace would seem desirable (Dickens, 2012). Yet the institutional architec-
ture required to give systematic force to legal standards is weak and fragmented in 
Ireland and indeed in LMEs generally. Evidence suggests that state enforcement agen-
cies in LMEs, one obvious mediating agent, are burdened with tightening resources and 
case overload, weakening their capacity for effective oversight (Ahlering and Deakin, 
2007; Teague, 2009). Furthermore, such bodies are highly dependent on the extent of 
support from the ruling political classes and invariably, in LMEs, are often assigned 
powers in law that are ‘light touch’.
Indeed it may seem curious to argue, but for the law to secure non-union employee 
access to I&C, the condition of non-unionism might first need to be addressed. Statutory 
employee rights, like consultation, are typically observed more widely in the sectors 
characterised by firm-level collective bargaining (Jenkins and Blyton, 2008) indicating a 
positive mediating effect. This may simply be because union representatives have the 
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expertise to diffuse knowledge of legal standards within the workplace and exert power 
to coax employers to institute policies and procedures that give effect to statutes. 
Strengthening the institution of firm-level collective bargaining might be a prior condi-
tion for enforcing employee rights to I&C. Rather than it being a case of the law replac-
ing declining collective bargaining as is sometimes assumed, the issue is, as Heery 
(2011) notes, one of recombination so that the former acts as a precedent, sanction and 
standard for the latter. In principle at least, Irish unions may have been right in their par-
tial agnosticism to I&C legislation, opting to channel their energies towards securing 
legislative support for collective bargaining. In practice however, the same forces favour-
ing dilution of the Directive have vigorously opposed any legal strengthening of collec-
tive bargaining in Ireland (D’Art and Turner, 2011). This suggests a ‘cold house’ for the 
percolation of I&C rights unless other conditions favouring union mobilisation, organis-
ing and recognition occur. In the absence of a supportive bulwark and the continuation of 
swathes of non-unionism, the insertion of I&C structures into union-free settings will 
likely produce ‘atomised islets of employee voice’ (Butler, 2005: 285), vulnerable to the 
kind of unilateral employer manipulation seen in our case.
Conclusion
This article contributes to an understanding of how employers might respond to non-
union employees attempting to invoke their legal rights to I&C. The evidence demon-
strates, in relation to EPICA 2006, that even where valid opt-ins are secured and the 
legislative framework is self-consciously initiated by employees, the regulatory pathway 
is porous and non-union employers can elude its ambit. This imposes a considerable 
burden on the agency of non-union employees to ensure regulatory requirements are 
upheld. In the Irish context, such outcomes were attributable to the wider institutional 
context of pliable EU regulatory transposition. We suggest that in the absence of regula-
tory institutions capable of performing positive mediation of the law, the likelihood of 
successful opt-ins under the regulations in the non-union sector will be low. In a non-
union context, opt-ins may well occur under the shadow of the law, but this shadow is 
faint and easily penetrable by employer power.
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Notes
 1. Its full title is Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the 
European Community. Henceforth it is referred to as the I&C Directive
 2. The CAC database is available at www.cac.gov.co.uk; the Labour Court database, at www.
labourcourt.ie. The CAC is a UK independent body with statutory powers designed to resolve 
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collective disputes either by voluntary agreement or through legal decision. Under ICER 
2004, the CAC has a statutory obligation to make decisions under the regulations. The Labour 
Court is an Irish industrial relations body empowered to issue non-binding Recommendations 
(or legally binding Determinations/Decisions/Orders, depending on the type of case) on 
disputes.
 3. ICER 2004 can be viewed in full at www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/3426/contents/made. 
EPICA 2006 can be viewed in full at www.irishstatutebook.ie/2006/en/act/pub/0009/index.
html.
 4. The Standard Rules, applying across both jurisdictions, require information on the recent and 
probable development of the undertaking’s activities and economic situation; I&C on the situ-
ation, structure and probable development of employment within the undertaking; and I&C 
(with a view to reaching agreement) on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation and contractual relations.
 5. EPICA 2006, Section 12 ‘Co-operation: When defining or implementing practical arrange-
ments for information and consultation under this Act, the employer and one or more employ-
ees or his or her representatives (or both) shall work in a spirit of co-operation, having due 
regard to their reciprocal rights and duties, and taking into account the interests both of the 
undertaking and of the employees.’ ICER 2004 has a similar provision in Regulation 21.
 6. EPICA 2006, Section 9(2) states: ‘A pre-existing agreement shall be (a) in writing and dated, 
(b) signed by the employer, (c) approved by the employees, (d) applicable to all employees 
to whom the agreement relates, and (e) available for inspection by those persons and at the 
location agreed by the parties.’
 7. EPICA 2006, Section 15 (2) states: ‘Disputes between an employer and one or more employ-
ees or his or her representatives (or both) concerning: (a) negotiations under section 8 or 10 … 
may … be referred by the employer, one or more than one employee or his or her representa-
tives (or both) to the Court for investigation … only after (a) recourse to the internal dispute 
resolution procedure (if any) in place in the employment concerned has failed to resolve the 
dispute, and (b) the dispute has been referred to the Commission.’ ‘The Commission’ refers to 
the Labour Relations Commission (LRC), see note 8.
 8. The LRC offers a conciliation, mediation and advisory service designed to assist the resolu-
tion and prevention of workplace disputes in Ireland. Under EPICA 2006, disputes must be 
first forwarded to the LRC which, having made available its services to resolve the dispute, 
can furnish a certificate to the Court stating that no further efforts on its part will advance its 
resolution.
 9. Rights Commissioners operate as a service of the LRC although are independent in their 
functions. They investigate disputes, grievances and claims that individuals or small groups 
of workers refer under specific legislation and issue the findings of their investigations in 
the form of either decisions or non-binding recommendations, depending on the legislation 
under which a case is referred. Under EPICA 2006 the Commissioners’ primary function is 
to investigate instances and issue decisions where employee representatives have claimed 
penalisation for pursing their duties in accordance with the Act.
10. EPICA 2006, Section 19 provides for an offence where a person fails to carry out, for exam-
ple, the application of the Standard Rules.
11. The Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) adjudicates on individual employment law.
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